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Stalking usually occurs as part of a concerted effort by the perpetrator either 
explicitly or implicitly to make their victim(s) aware of the presence of the 
stalker.[1] Most of the stalking related cases that have arisen in Queensland since 
the enactment of anti-stalking legislation have occurred where the victim was aware 
of such actions by the perpetrator. As such the question whether the victim is 
required to know they are in fact being stalked, has not arisen in many of these 
prosecutions.  To illustrate the types of conduct that might typify acts of stalking, one 
needs look no further than the case of R v Ali  which involved one party who 
perpetrated a range of acts over a period of 18 months that culminated in a 
conviction of stalking and a sentence of three years jail, pursuant to s 359B(d).[2] 
 
The case of Ali initially started out as a dispute between residential neighbours 
concerning a common fence.  Although the relationship was initially ‘satisfactory’, the 
victim later claimed that relations between the two quickly deteriorated after a 
dispute about a fence and the appellant then launched a concerted campaign that 
consisted of acts causing loud noises by banging on the fence, using power tools 
close to the boundary line, running lawn mowers close to the boundary and 
deliberately lighting fires in order that the ensuing smoke would drift onto the 
property of the appellant.[3] 
 
The Alis later installed video cameras directed at the victim’s house and this was 
coupled with abusive language, ‘wolf-whistling’, offensive gestures, loud music, 
rubbish thrown into the victim’s yard, and the complainant’s plants mysteriously 
dying.[4]  To compound matters, the Alis then erected three white crosses on the 
fence for the purpose of keeping the ‘devil’ away.[5]  The victim claimed that as a 
result of the conduct of the accused, she was forced to take sleeping pills in order to 
combat emotional stress. The case of Ali illustrates the type of acts that anti-stalking 
legislation is perhaps most suited to be applied against and it is not difficult to see 
how the criminal law could legitimately be applied in circumstances where the acts of 
the perpetrator are as overt and offensive as those outlined in this case. Such acts 
can therefore be considered as part of the rationale for the justification of offences 
relating to anti-stalking. 
  
Rationale for State Coercion 
At what point is state coercion an acceptable imposition on an individual’s freedom 
for acts which are in the first instance bereft of illegality and appear, at least on 
a prima facie level, innocuous in nature?[6]  This notion is raised by H L A Hart when 
he asks why are certain actions forbidden by law and others are not.[7]  Hart asserts 
that it is for the legislature to deem certain behaviour unlawful and in doing so it 
‘announces to society that these particular actions are not to be done and to secure 
that fewer of them are done.’[8]  It would seem that Hart made this rational 
assumption on the basis of having overtly wrongful acts in mind, such as murder 
where it is easy to discern wrongful acts.[9]   
 
However, the problem arises with stalking since many acts of the stalker may not 
necessarily appear overtly wrong.  Giving flowers or making contact in some benign 
way does not automatically relegate an individual into the realms of criminality.  Hart 
is correct to say that one aim of the criminal law is to deem certain conduct criminal, 
and it comes down to posited rules which set ‘standards of behaviour to encourage 
certain types of conduct and discourage others … ‘.[10] In a true positivist sense, 
therefore, Hart argues that it is the law posited by the legislature that will determine 
whether such actions are in fact unlawful.[11] 
 
One problem posed by this assertion, is the ever present danger that certain actions 
which appear prima facie benign could in fact attract criminal sanction in the context 
of stalking. This is because there exists a duality between innocent acts and those 
that are implicitly criminal due to the intent of the performer of those acts, the latter of 
which might appear quite normal and part of everyday activities but for the mens 
rea of the perpetrator. The line dividing these two categories is not clearly discernible 
in the language used in the statute itself and it is therefore for the Courts to resolve 
this ambiguity by determining which acts fall into the unlawful variety and therefore 
warrant punishment by the criminal law.  The challenge facing the courts however is 
to articulate a theoretical framework in which such distinctions can be justified in a 
fair and reasoned manner.  
 
One problem relates to when ordinary acts become transformed into criminal acts 
and therefore require the restriction of an individual’s freedom? Put another way, 
what are the limits of criminal sanction that should be imposed in relation to those 
acts? Joel Feinberg lists four types of acts or purposes for which he calls ‘commonly 
proposed liberty-limiting principles’ that the law may legitimately coerce an individual 
and thereby restrict their liberty.[12] 
 
The restriction of one’s liberty through the use of anti-stalking criminal laws, can be 
framed as a jurisprudential question that is part of a much larger tapestry of political 
and philosophical discourse concerning social control, on the one hand, and the 
expression of human agency, on the other.[13] The essence of whether the victim is 
required to know that he or she is being stalked goes to this very notion of ‘liberty’, 
and to the extent that it should or ought to be limited by the state.  For by imposing a 
legal burden on the prosecution to prove that the victim knew or apprehended fear of 
violence, this goes towards affirming the accused’s personal autonomy, and that it 
can only be revoked when some more tangible form of harm is suffered by the 
complainant. One could assert that there should be no requirement under criminal 
law, that the prosecution need to prove actual presence of a mental element in 
relation to the victim in order for the offence to be made out.  Surely the purpose of 
the criminal law is not to unduly place the burden of proof on the Crown to prove 
beyond all reasonable doubt that the victim knew or apprehended fear or violence 
stemming from the actions of the accused? 
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